

TURKISH SOCIALISM THESIS IN THE AXIS OF *YÖN* JOURNAL

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ABSTRACT

In this study, *Yön* Journal, which has an important place in shaping the Turkish political life after 1960, and the Turkish Socialism thesis which was mentioned for the first time in this journal are discussed. *Yön* dealing with political, social and economic matters was published on a weekly basis from 1961 to 1967 with a total of 222 issues. The ideas expressed in *Yön* can be considered as the follow-up of the thoughts developed in the 1930s in the *Kadro* (Cadre) Journal. As it is tried to be put forward in this study, although the issues such as the fact that a statist economic policy can be considered as the most important factor in the development of Turkish Revolution principles, the opinions expressed in *Yön* movement indicate some differences in accordance with the new political structure of the period. The concept of the social state laid down in the 1961 Constitution and the greater expansion of freedom than ever before by the new constitution were the basis of differences between these two periods. Turkish socialism thesis, which was put forward in the 'relatively free atmosphere' of the 60s, presented a new model specific to Turkey. In this regard, *Yön* Journal and Turkish socialism thesis were handled in the context of the conditions of the changing period after the military coup of May 27, 1960.

Key Words: *Yön* Journal, Socialism, Statism, Turkish Socialism, Socialist Culture Association.

YÖN DERGİSİ EKSENİNDE TÜRK SOSYALİZMİ TEZİ

ÖZ

Bu çalışmada 1960 sonrası Türk siyasal hayatının şekillenmesinde önemli bir yere sahip olan *Yön* dergisi ve ilk kez bu dergide ifade edilen Türk Sosyalizmi tezi ele alınmıştır. *Yön* dergisi 1961 yılından 1967 yılına kadar toplam 222 sayı siyasal, sosyal ve ekonomik konuların ele alındığı haftalık yayınlanan dergidir. Söz konusu dergide ifade edilen düşünceler bir bakıma 1930'lu yıllarda *Kadro* dergisinde gelişen düşünce akımının devamı olarak kabul edilebilir. Bu çalışmada ortaya konulmaya çalışılacağı üzere, Türk Devrim ilkeleri ekseninde devletçi bir iktisat politikasının kalkınmayı sağlayabilecek en önemli unsur olarak görülmesi gibi konular aynı kalmakla birlikte, *Yön* hareketi içinde ifade edilen düşünceler dönemin yeni siyasal yapısı ile uyumlu olarak bazı farklılıklar göstermektedir. 1961 Anayasasındaki "sosyal devlet" kavramı ve yeni anayasa ile özgürlüklerin daha önce olmadığı kadar genişletilmesi bu iki dönem arasındaki farklılığın temelini teşkil etmiştir. Türk sosyalizmi tezi ise 60'ların görece özgürlük ortamında ortaya atılan, Türkiye'ye özgü yeni bir model olarak sunulmuştur. Bu bağlamda, *Yön* dergisi ve Türk sosyalizmi tezi 27 Mayıs 1960 askeri darbesi sonrası değişen dönemin koşulları ekseninde ele alınmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Yön* Dergisi, Sosyalizm, Devletçilik, Türk Sosyalizmi, Sosyalist Kültür Derneği.

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INTRODUCTION

After the single-party rule, lasting 23 years, Turkey passed to democracy and in 1950, Democrat Party (DP) came to power up until 1960 by the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. Rising opposition against the Republican People's Party (RPP) and its policies gave way the DP to be favored by private enterprises, commercial, and landowners. Upon the DP came to power, Turkey experienced the rapid economic growth by the implementation of liberal policies and by the effects of the American aids as well. On the other hand, the boost in economic development did not last long and in the following years, Turkey faced with rising prices, soaring inflation, shortage of goods and black marketeering. Additionally, Menderes was intolerant any opposition voice, thus, some strict precautions were taken in his term, for instance, press laws were tightened, a number of freedoms were restricted (Karpat, 2010, pp. 238-239). In the wake of the election in 1957, as well as economic deprivation, political repression over oppositions was getting more visible and thus, social unrest started to arise. At the end, Menderes could not come up with new policies to regain his supporters. Actually, the Party had come to power in a belief that free competition without any governmental restriction in the economy could provide rapid economic growth; however, it did not catch up first years' speedy development afterwards (Ahmad, 1977, p. 66). As a result, DP's power lasting a decade was ended by the first military intervention of Turkey on May 27, 1960.

Upon the *coup d'etat*, a group was organized as a National Unity Committee (NUC-*Milli Birlik Komitesi*), which comprised of a thirty-eight officer under the leadership of Cemal Gürsel, Commander in Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces. The coup was legitimized on the grounds that it was a necessary step to save democracy and the Atatürk reforms, and soon it was promised to return to a civilian order. In the meantime, Cemal Gürsel's statement, which stated that Turkey had a need for social reforms and "socialism", which has been considered as a taboo until that time, would be benefited made the social dimension of military intervention become more apparent (Karpat, 2010, pp. 242-243). However, the fact that the coup was not carried out in a chain of command and that there was no complete consensus on the direction of the intervention resulted in the development of different factions within the army; thus, the army remained active in the political sphere. In the 1960s, Turkey witnessed two coup attempts and intervention warnings of different groups within the army. At the end of this period, the army intervened again in the political process on March 12, 1971.

The new constitution, redrafted and came into force in 1961, formed in a manner of giving more rights to political parties, associations, and the press. The fact that the privileged positions of military and civilian bureaucrats lost their power during the DP ruling caused these groups to welcome the *coup d'etat* with great enthusiasm and led to the radicalization of their thoughts in the 1960s by the new constitution, which made the liberty more possible. *Yön*, began to be published at the beginning of this radicalization, was established by a group of intellectuals who came from the RPP in 1950s during which the DP was in power. They found a ground to express their ideas six months after the new constitution was in force, thereby, the Journal began its publication life under the leadership of Doğan Avcıoğlu on December 20, 1961. Even though several intellectuals contributed to the journal, the core cadre of the authors, besides Avcıoğlu, included Mümtaz Soysal, İlhami Soysal, İlhan Selçuk, Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu (Atılğan, 2008, p. 240).

In this study, "Turkish socialism" thesis declared by Şevket Süreyya Aydemir will be examined in the axis of *Yön* Journal. Turkish socialism, in a sense, is a concept defended by other intellectuals in the Journal as "new statism", "advanced statism", "reformist statism" or "nationalist socialism"; however, the notion was expressed and explained for the first time by

Şevket Süreyya Aydemir. In the second part of the study, the general line of *Yön* Journal will be examined within the context of the political conditions of the period so that Turkish socialism thesis is understood clearly. Then, while the Turkish Socialism thesis is being examined, it will be tried to be discovered that the ideas defended by Aydemir in *Yön* were the follow-up of the thoughts presented in the *Kadro* journal in the 1930s. In the final part, upon the evaluation of the Turkish socialism thesis, the changing discourse of *Yön* after the 1965 elections and the evolving process of the journal towards *Devrim* Journal will be discussed.

1. THE ATTITUDES OF YÖN IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 1960s

The first military coup of Turkey, which was called "May 27 Movement" by *Yön*, chiefly targetted the right-wing DP government and aimed to turn the state back to the Kemalist principles, met thankfully by the most of the leftists and founding members of the *Yön*, as well. Hikmet Özdemir states that, when the bureaucrat-intellectual who was in the leading position in the foundation of Turkey and in the development of the Turkish revolution lost their status and became the opposition because of the public support shown to DP, they became suspicious towards the multi-party regime and DP power, and therefore, they pinned great hopes upon the military who intervened the regime (Özdemir, 1986, p. 270). The comment of Avcıoğlu about the *coup d'état* was a kind of the summary of the general ideas of *Yön* writers that May 27 Movement was the reaction of "active forces" (*zinde güçler*) against the power that gave way to the loss of the valuable years to the country (Avcıoğlu, 1962c, p. 3).

The founders of the Journal stressed that *Yön* came up with a solution to rescue Turkey from underdevelopment and aimed to bring the state back to the Kemalist principles. Basically, they had a strong feeling to bring a socialist order to Turkey, because they believed that the country has been among the underdeveloped countries, so the only method for the liberty and social justice is socialism. In the first issue, the Journal published its declaration called The Declaration of Intellectuals (*Aydınların Ortak Bildirisi*) signed by a range of intellectuals from lawyers, teachers, academicians, journalists to tradesmen. As stated in the declaration, the purpose of the Journal was to reach contemporary civilization level aimed by Atatürk Revolutions, to solve the educational problems, to protect the Turkish democracy, and to establish the social justice. Besides, it was believed that succeeding in these issues could only be achieved by means of a rapid development in the economic field, namely, achievement of these issues depend on the success of increasing the national production level. Since they attributed continued instability of politics to the underdevelopment of Turkey's economy, economic well-being was seen as a major problem above any other issues of the state. Furthermore, *Yön* trusted in democracy and the importance of the democratic institutions, however, the establishment of these values in the society would be futile as long as a solution was not found to the unemployment and increasing the level of welfare (Yön, 1961, p. 12). As a result, believing the country is getting away from the principles of Turkish Revolution, *Yön* focused on the economic development by changing the current economic way of the country with respect to the Kemalist principles. They tried to explain these thoughts within the framework of "socialism".

Welcoming the military coup, *Yön* circle thought that the military authority had to make structural reforms before handing back political power to the civil government. However, the NUC was divided as those wishing to transfer power to civilians as quickly as possible and those who wished to carry out reforms that would change the political structure of the country before letting the activities of political parties. While the first group, which had

close relations with the RPP, wanted to re-establishment of the parliamentary order in a short period of time; the plan of the second group led by Alparslan Türkeş was in favor of the continuation of the military administration at least four years or more if necessary. The first group, directed by Gürsel and the generals, are called as the moderates whereas the second group, comprised of colonel and lower rank officers, are called as the radicals or extremists (Ahmad, 1977, p. 165; Karpat, 2010, p. 244). Due to conflicts between moderates and radicals, the NUC was paralyzed at the end of October and not allowing to the continuation of this situation, generals decided to eliminate the radicals. On November 13, Gürsel announced that the old NUC had been disbanded and a new 23-member committee had been formed. Fourteen members were liquidated, and upon the liquidation, the NUC became almost entirely dependent on the RPP's support and guidance (Karpat, 2010, p. 244). The Constituent Assembly, which was founded in December, held its first meeting on January 6, 1961, and began to share its legislative duties with the NUC. Thus, the first step towards civilian rule was taken. In the first year of the coup, the Constituent Assembly adopted the new constitution and an electoral code, and the July 9th was determined as the referendum date for the constitution (Ahmad, 1977, p. 170). The new constitution adopted liberal economic and social objectives which were far beyond the economic and intellectual capabilities of Turkey.² It preserved the principles of populism, statism, and revolutionism with new principles such as democratic and social state while preserving secularism. If this constitution had applied faithfully, it could have promised a liberal and democratic Turkey, but it radicalized the politics. This became a fundamental contradiction; because neo-democrats (Justice Party-JP, New Turkish Party-NTP, Republican Peasant Nation Party-RPNP, and conservative RPPs) was determined to prevent the implementation of it. Nevertheless, the constitution allowed for the groups - workers and radical intellectuals - who had been under strict control before 1960 - to carry out a political struggle against the settled forces (Ahmad, 1977, p. 186; Karpat, 2010, pp. 245, 249). The characteristic of the new constitution provided a suitable environment for the intellectuals in *Yön* to express their thoughts in the axis of socialism.

Though giving place to historical issues, *Yön* frequently discussed subjects related to daily politics in its column and criticized the lines of the political parties. While being distant and critical to the JP, the perception of *Yön* to the RPP-thought to be closest to their own ideas- varied from time to time. When the first election was held on October 15, 1961 and Turkey met coalitions in politics for the first time, *Yön* was in favor of the RPP. Though the RPP won the election, its percentage of votes could not be enough to come into power alone and the party formed a coalition with the JP, thought to be the successor of the DP (Tachau, 1991, p. 107). Avcioğlu stressed that even though conservatives were outnumbered in the parliament, deep-rooted reforms are still possible under the Prime Ministry of İsmet İnönü. He thought that in the current situation of the parliament, İnönü can handle the land reform, problems about education and taxes by democratic means (Avcioğlu, 1962a, p. 3). Besides believing to the RPP in the parliament, *Yön* also trusted to the leading power of the military so as to implement reforms. From their point of view, the army was the most important component in society both for being a force in rapid development in social justice and preventing "reactionists" that would hinder the implementation of social reforms. It was said that "the army, which led the country to advance rapidly in Atatürk's era, is the most substantial force today as well" (Avcioğlu, 1962b, p. 3). On the other hand, as the time passed, *Yön* began to believe that RPP is not capable of challenging other parties in the parliament about the issues such as the land reform, social justice, and statism, so *Yön*

² The 1961 Constitution providing bicameral parliament, National Assembly and the Senate, was different from its predecessor.

withdrew its support from RPP (Avcıoğlu, 1962c, p. 3). It was believed that the only way out for Turkey is the non-capitalist development finding its best shape in socialism, but İnönü took many steps making concessions to the free enterprise. By 1963, the right-wing and the moderates had maintained control both in the RPP and in the coalition governments and thus, they obstruct the leftists' desire for power (Karpas, 2010, pp. 250-251). The short-term RPP-JP coalition was followed by failed coalitions. In the axis of these developments, the discourses of the *Yön* also began to change after the general election in 1965.

It is important to note that like *Yön*, the Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*-in short *TİP*) was established at the beginning of 1961 as a result of the 'relatively free atmosphere', as well. Even if they both had socialist origins, *TİP* and *Yön* had different understandings in terms of how to reach their aims. While *TİP* was founded as a working-class based party from the beginning and discoursed upon the proletariat, *Yön* Movement neither took shape towards the leadership of the workers nor embraced politics as a struggle among classes. For *Yön*, politics was a process occurred between the military officers and intelligentsia called "active forces" and reactionaries named as "status quo supporters" (Atılğan, 2008, p. 168). Therefore, even though both had the same aim, bringing socialism to Turkey through legal means, *Yön* authors did not prefer to collaborate with *TİP*. Since *Yön* believed that working-class was not strong enough in Turkey, they opted to collaborate with already strong classes who were military officers and intelligentsia.

It can be argued that the core difference between the viewpoints of *Yön* and *TİP* on socialism stems from the consistent emphasis of *Yön* writers to Kemalism. As also stated by Atılğan, each writer in the *Yön* circle was a faithful Kemalist and socialist. They saw the ample opportunities of Kemalism and tended towards redefining it through Marxism. In this way, they wanted Turkey to reach socialism and they were sincerely believed that the salvation of Turkey was in socialism (Atılğan, 2008, p. 56). In parallel, they frequently addressed that the socialism model they offered was compatible with the principles of Kemalism. For instance, by referring to Yakup Kadri, Şevket Süreyya stated that Atatürk had a socialist view and his principles were compatible with socialism (Aydemir, 1962p, p. 12). The fact that *Yön* circle based their development program on a classless society instead of the working class is a reflection of the strong relationship they established with Kemalism and constituted the breaking point in relations with *TİP*.

Seeking for an answer to the question of how Turkey can develop, *Yön* believed that under-developed countries like Turkey can not develop based on private capital and capitalist way. According to Avcıoğlu, "the capitalist way is a block for the underdeveloped countries in the twentieth century" (Yön, 1963a, p. 9). However, Avcıoğlu stated that socialism is not the issue of the present day and cannot be an option for Turkey because socialism can be possible in the event of a presence of large-scale industry and a strong working class, whereas there is neither a large industry nor strong working class in Turkey (Avcıoğlu, 1963, pp. 8-9). Instead of directly passing to the socialism, *Yön* writers adopted the understanding of new statism which is a solution for countries which did not develop by means of capitalism and socialism like Turkey. For them, new statism was the shortest way to be prepared for socialism by following a non-capitalist way (Soysal, 1962, p. 14).

In the understanding of new statism, the private enterprise and the state enterprise would live together, but the private sector should not dominate the state. Such a development dominated by the private sector cannot be democratic because it subordinates the political power to the economic power (Yön, 1961, p. 12). Furthermore, it was declared by *Yön* that new statism is a convenient system to eliminate inequality in income distribution, to realize social security, to prevent exploitation of producers and consumers and to resolve the

disparities between regions. As a result, new statism was seen as the most important instrument to spread democracy to the masses and it was believed that democracy is a system that would enable the people with low incomes to have equal educational opportunities (Yön, Bildiri, 1961, p. 13). While general lines of the new statism defended by *Yön* journal were expressed in this way, as it will be discussed in the following part, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir was the first author to discuss this understanding in his writings and conceptualized it as Turkish socialism.

While *Yön* has a noteworthy reader and valuable writer population, an unexpected development led to a pause in the journal's life. By February 22, 1962, a group of soldiers under the leadership of Talat Aydemir (who believed that the very early transfer of power to civilians was a serious mistake) attempted to a military coup and he tried it for the second time on May 21, 1963. *Yön* was accused of supporting the intervention, thus it was closed down on June 5, 1963, upon 77th issue, for fifteen months period (Atılğan, 2008, p. 175; Özdemir, 1986, p. 57). When it was reopened, the journal perpetually continued to be published on a weekly basis until 1967. The period when the journal was started to re-publish on September 25, 1964, was the deterioration of Turkish-American relations, basically because the Cyprus Question gave ways to rise to American antagonism among the public at that time. *Yön* writers believed that bilateral agreements between USA and Turkey and Turkey's NATO membership overshadowed the independence of the country. Moreover, they thought that the imperialist capital and its collaborators impede the development of the country and the national capital. Therefore, *Yön* followed remarkably anti-imperialism issues in its columns; they called for a boycott of American goods like Coca-Cola (Atılğan, 2008, p. 183; 1965, p. 1). Following the closure, the ideas of the journal changed and they believed that rapid development within social justice is not possible to be implemented by the current power. They supported that only when the existing system is changed by the democratic reforms, they will reach their aims. *Yön* advocated "democratic national liberation movement" at that period, so the salvation of the nation was attributed to the democratic parliamentary way (Atılğan, 2008, p. 175). It was very likely that they attempted to try whether the parliamentary way is still possible or not just before they take a big leap toward an idea of the revolution that will be an issue the last part of the study.

2. "TURKISH SOCIALISM" THESIS IN *YÖN*

Turkish socialism thesis was discussed and conceptualized for the first time by Şevket Süreyya Aydemir in the columns of *Yön* journal. Nevertheless, Aydemir constructed the Turkish socialism thesis over the accumulation of his intellectual evolvment and the thoughts that he expressed under this concept manifests continuity with his former thoughts. Therefore, it is considered important for this study to explain which thoughts he adopted before reaching the Turkish socialism thesis.

Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1897-1976) was one of the prominent intellectuals in the Turkish political thought. Besides his voluminous biographical masterpieces about the pioneer figures of the Turkish history, he was also known as an ideologue of *Kadro* (Cadre)³ movement, one of the writers in *Yön* journal, the daily *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*. Aydemir

³ *Kadro* Journal was founded for the systematization of the Turkish revolution and published between January 1932 and December 1934 by Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Vedat Nedim Tör (1897-1985), İsmail Hüsrev Tokin (1902-1992), Burhan Asaf Belge (1899-1967), Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu (1889-1974), and Mehmet Şevki Yazman (1896-1974). Due to the Journal's distinctive character and its impact on Turkish political life, these intellectuals were evoked by the title of the journal as *Kadrocular* and their attempt was identified as a Movement (Güven-Toker, 2019, pp. 127-128).

adopted different thoughts throughout his life like Ottomanism, Turanism, Communism and he made efforts to keep the principles of the Turkish Revolution alive (Güven-Toker, 2019). While he adopted communism in 1920s, he explicitly explained his ideas about the current situation of Turkey in his book "*Lenin ve Leninizm*" (Lenin and Leninism), written in 1924, and also in an article in *Aydınlık Journal*⁴ as follows: "In our country the lumpen proletariat who are unemployed and briefly not specialized were increasing rather than the proletarian. ...In our country, there has been no social ground in order to implement neither the social democracy nor the other kinds of mass movement yet" (Aydemir & Celal, 1924, p. 44; Süreyya, 1924, pp. 519-523). In the early years of the Republic, he believed that Turkey should establish its own national capital and industry, thus, she will not depend on foreign countries and their aids (Süreyya, 1925, p. 783). It is important to note that anti-imperialism and development of a national economy were at the center in Aydemir's discourses starting from the mid-1920s to rest of his life.

Before *Kadro*, Aydemir explicitly expressed his ideas in a conference⁵ held in the *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearts) with the issue named "*İnkılabın İdeolojisi*" (Ideology of the Revolution) on January 15, 1931 (Üstel, 2004, p. 392; Aydemir, 2011, p. 27). The main idea of his speech was the description and understanding of the Turkish Revolution. Aydemir advocated that the Turkish Revolution was such a unique revolution that it tried to establish an unprivileged, classless, and coherent nation structure inside the country. Moreover, he believed that acquiring an unconditional political and economic freedom abroad, and at the same time, having economic and political cooperation under an equal condition with all countries in the world were the purposes and targets of the Turkish Revolution which represented the National Liberation Movement (Aydemir, 2011, p. 98; Süreyya, 1934b). He put emphasis on the economy that the state has to lead in the development of the country. At that time, he described his economic model as an order of a social nationalism which was neither a total socialism nor a totalitarian state capitalism. It was just a planned statist regulation (Aydemir, 2016, p. 363). To him, in the new national structure of Turkey, both socialist and liberal class dictatorships are refused; rather there is a new understanding, social nationalism, that rises above the national structure and prefers the unity of the nation in economic interest. This concept of social nationalism is an understanding based on a nation structure which is organized around a state-run economic model and it is anti-imperialist outside, anti-capitalist inside (Süreyya, 1934c-1935; Aydemir, 2011, p. 166). Aydemir believed that social nationalism does not contain contradictions and fragmentations within the society and it involves equal economic and political conditions in the international arena.

In *Kadro*, Aydemir supported that the Turkish Revolution was not a continuation, an imitation, or a compilation; rather, it was a different case, an example, and a new beginning. It was not the copy of democracy (assumed to be political ideology of capitalism) socialism (based on class domination), fascism (performs for the minority dictatorship and serves to imperialism), or any other social order (Süreyya, 1933b, p. 5; Süreyya, 1933a). From the perspective of Aydemir, anti-imperialism is the core, original and unique characteristic of the national liberation movements. This definite characteristic is one of the most obvious

⁴ *Aydınlık Journal* was the publication organ of the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) founded on June 1, 1921, by Şefik Hüsnü Değmer (Akbulut & Tuncay, 2012, pp. 67-68; Tuncay, 1978, p. 308). *Aydınlık* could not be a periodical journal at that time, but it became the backbone of the leftist publications from the Liberation War up until the *Takrir-i Sükun Law* (Law for the Maintenance of Order) and then, in February 1925, it was closed with the 30th issue.

⁵ In the following weeks of the Menemen Incident, a series of conferences were organized to discuss both the incident and the development of the revolutions with the participation of the important intellectuals such as Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Sadri Maksudi Arsal, Mehmet Emin Erişirgil, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (Toker, 2018, p. 46).

qualities that distinguishes it from fascism, capitalism, and socialism (Süreyya, 1933c). Putting emphasis to the uniqueness of Turkish Revolution, he believed that political independence must bring economic development with it. Thus, with the success of National Liberation, Turkey should get rid of being an open market and should take place in the world economy with equal economic and political rights immediately. To accomplish this, the only way is the implementation of planned statism. Although *Kadro* writers had explanations about the planned economy, Aydemir emerged as the most prominent theorist of the "plan" among the authors of *Kadro* (Ertan, 1994, pp. 102-103). To Aydemir "the plan is a national cooperation that is regulated. The concept of the plan is now the most characteristic feature of the period and the order of the society of tomorrow can only be an order of the planned society" (Süreyya, 1932, p. 8). The plan which was offered by Aydemir did not have a system based on the complete liquidation of the private property and the centralization of the production in a single hand like the socialist states. Planned statism was the enterprise order for the benefit of the public and created industrialization, technique, and organization under the roof of the state plan without causing the conflict of interests. The duty of the state, on condition of leaving the private sector free on some fields that may work profitably, is to set the national energy and advanced techniques based on national economy into motion. The issues of organizing and operating, and accordingly, planning are the fundamental matters of the new Turkey and the statism in Turkey (Süreyya, 1932). He believed the importance of planned statist system because to him, it was not possible to ask for monetary aid from the other states; we had to create our own national capital by mobilizing our own national industry. In order to create our own national capital, it was necessary that the state had to intervene into the economy and the enterprises (Aydemir, 1970, p. 5). Using this way, Turkey, in the new balance of the international arena, could develop itself, organize its national industry, possess its own transportation network, market the surplus of its production, and take its part in the global trade (Aydemir, 2011, pp. 69-70). These qualifications were not temporary characteristics because they emerged as a historical reaction against the liberal democracies and a follower of the order of the liberal democratic states; Turkey would be a new state type which would be economically and politically independent, and based on classless society and will be an example for the countries that are similar to Turkey, as well (Süreyya, 1934a).

As it is understood from the thoughts of Aydemir in 1930s, he supported the mixed economy that both state enterprise would be dominant in this order and private sector would find its own place in the economy. However, the relationship between the private enterprises and the state institutions would be at a certain level; in the face of these new developing state institutions, the class struggle should not dominate the economic functions of the state and the private enterprises in the economy should not cause the creation of the classes. According to Yanardağ, instead of the "anarchic structure" of the production of the capitalism, based on private enterprise, "planned statism" was suggested. *Kadro* saw the transition from the colonial economy to the national economy as the most important task on the front the Turkish Revolution (Yanardağ, 1988, pp. 140-141). As a consequence, in the 1930s, Aydemir did not see statism as a state intervention to economic life only, instead, for him, statism was proposed as a national and social order in which all the fields of national life were organized in such a way that the national interests were above all the individual interests. By this method, he believed that newly established Turkey would get rid of both imperialism and the negative effects of the Great Depression of the 1930s and would become self-sufficient with advanced technology.

Aydemir who put an intellectual stance through the thoughts he expressed in *Kadro* journal in the 1930s when Turkey was in a quest in the economic and political field, in a

sense, secluded himself in the period of the DP rule. The primary reason that attracted him to the intellectual life within the *Yön* movement was the thought that after the 1960 *coup d'etat*, an opportunity emerged to enable the country to enter a rapid modernization process in accordance with the principles of Turkish Revolution. Aydemir thought that 'the golden age' of Atatürk period had ended and the country got further away from the principles of the Turkish revolution. Therefore, he saw the *coup d'etat* as an opportunity to turn back to the line of the Turkish revolution. However, to him, this opportunity was missed due to the embodiment of the *coup d'etat* in a way that passes to the democratic system before necessary reforms implied. Pointing out the collision within the NUC, Aydemir argued that the *coup d'etat* did not serve to the expected goal. To him, there were two separate currents in the NUC that marked the *coup d'etat* and that the first of these forces was an attempt to establish a democratic and normal state of the law in a western sense. According to this current, the *coup d'etat* was made for this, it started with this slogan and the coup was an effort to save democracy, to establish and protect all democratic institutions which were demolished between 1950 to 1960. As long as it was within this framework, there could not be a revolutionary front of the 1960 *coup d'etat* (Aydemir, 1962h, p. 8). On the other hand, according to Aydemir, the second current, which appeared later in the NUC, did not want to be satisfied with liberating democratic institutions and to settle for a democratic legal structure only. They wanted to create a revolutionary excitement, to attribute this excitement to the masses, to take up cases in the country that only the revolution could achieve, and to establish institutions based on these aims. According to the proponents of the second current, the revolution must be deepened and shouldn't incarcerate itself in a normal legal system. It had to become a dynamic movement of struggle, social issues should be addressed, social reforms should be made, thereby, the reforms should be turned into a revolution (Aydemir, 1962h, p. 8). Contrary this, the first of these two currents prevailed; a new constitution after the revolution with the classic formulas was accepted, the new electoral law, the new elections, and finally the transfer of the power to a political party that would win the elections and returning to the barracks were completed. However, according to Aydemir, 1960 *coup d'etat* had to be done to return to Atatürk, to embrace his revolutions, to protect and complete their immunity. Arrangements without them would only lead the country to the disorder that took place before the revolution. Therefore, the revolution had to survive and continue. Large and cautious reforms were needed in the field of land, work, health, and education. These reforms could not be accomplished by political parties that could do nothing but fight. If the revolution had been able to be linked with reforms to be done in the national structure, Turkey would have gotten rid of the conflicts that were uncertain. Turkey was a social state of law according to the constitution, but the meaning of the institution called social was unclear and even is up in the air (Aydemir, 1962h, p. 8). The shape that the revolution took attracted Aydemir back into an active intellectual life. According to him, the Kemalist and nationalist intellectuals had to struggle to make the social benefits dominant (Aydemir, 1962p, p. 14).

Generally, the articles he wrote in *Yön* were in the direction of elimination of the existing problems about the adoption and implementation of the Kemalist principles. According to Aydemir, who constantly expressed this situation beginning from the first article, as he wrote in the sixth issue of the journal, the principles of Atatürk were understood as ordinary words and degenerated rather than adopting their meanings. For him, adoption of these principles was a matter of changing the mentality that was at least as essential as the military victories. At this point, Aydemir stated that not stable but a dynamic notion of Kemalism should be adopted (Aydemir, 1962a, p. 9). He believed that Turkey missed the opportunities of Mustafa Kemal period and later on, the country, particularly beginning from

1945, was governed by the politicians hoping for help for the future of the state outside its territory (Aydemir, 1962g, pp. 10-11).

Besides continuing to advocating these ideas which were the same as in *Kadro* journal, Aydemir went one step further in his thoughts and supported socialism that was unique to Turkey. As Yanardağ stated, while Aydemir defined the socialism, he added the "Turkish" to the socialism, thus he combined socialism with a nationalist manner (Yanardağ, 1988, p. 195). Through such a conceptualization, he tried to attribute an intrinsic character to his model. In addition to believing that Turkey has distinctive circumstances, the other reason laid behind Aydemir's resorting to such a conceptualization was the fact that the word of socialism become a term having a feared and avoided meaning in the society. Therefore, he explained Turkish socialism thesis firstly through an analysis of socialism. In this context, he made a classification in socialism through making a distinction of revolutionary and non-revolutionary socialism. According to Aydemir, revolutionary socialism which he defined as communism was mainly based on class conflict and it is expected that economic conflicts spread to the social area in the society and, finally, result in revolution and communist order (Aydemir, 1962k, p. 20). On the other hand, non-revolutionary socialism, which is called "reformist socialism" and which set off its own struggle in Western Europe, is not the kind of socialism that Marx explained in the 19th century. Reformist socialism neither is based on class conflicts nor targets to reach a revolution, instead, it aims to prevent excessive class differentiation through the interference of the state in social and economic areas and to provide the fair distribution of income within social justice (Aydemir, 1963d, p. 16).

Aydemir stated that the Kemalist statism was also nothing more than socialism in the Western sense since it put the economic function of the state at the forefront and advocated the harmony of the class. Therefore, the reformist socialism was the basis of "Turkish socialism" (Aydemir, 1962b, p. 7). Nevertheless, while he declared that Turkish socialism was a reformist socialism, he put emphasis on the differences between Turkey and Western European countries in terms of implementation of reformist socialism. To him, capitalist development in the West was based on external revenues and had a great foreign market advantage. The fact that Western countries exported their goods to the rest of the world caused great capital accumulation and so workers of these countries benefited from this wealth as much as possible. On the contrary, Turkey did not have these kinds of accumulation and affluence since the beginning of the Republic due to the feudal ruins, capitulations, the interest of foreign countries and their investments. Moreover, external revenues could not be increased. Therefore, Turkey could feed capitalist development with foreign aid and foreign capital. In parallel, Aydemir argued that these circumstances settle Turkey to a special place where Turkey needs a distinctive development model; and Turkish socialism which aimed at creating a self-contained economy instead of waiting for the foreign aids meets this need (Aydemir, 1962l, p. 8; Aydemir, 1962p, pp. 13-14; Aydemir, 1964, p. 16). To him, it is possible to organize our own social order according to our own conditions, history and social needs, so, we should not allow external intervention to improve our state. Moreover, to create our social order there is no need to become communists as well (Aydemir, 1963a, p. 16).

While explaining his model, as he had stated in *Kadro* movement, Aydemir put mixed economic model based on statism to the center of the Turkish socialism thesis. He argued that state control over the economy was much more necessary than it was in the past because, since 1945, the principle of statism was degenerated just like other principles of Kemalism. To him, Turkey tackled with the Great Depression via statism in the 1930s, but if there would be a global economic crisis again, it might not be easy to overcome this kind of crisis, because the country was dependent upon the foreign capital and aids (Aydemir, 1962i, p. 15).

What is more, Turkey was turned into a satellite of Western imperialism through following a capitalist economic model without establishing its own national industry and capital. Therefore, a mixed economic system which functions for both the public interest and private enterprise is necessary for the development of economically and politically independent Turkey (Aydemir, 1962o, p. 9).

The mixed economy advocated by Aydemir had two dimensions, one based on the state's undertaking of industrial activities which could not be fulfilled by the private enterprise, and the other based on the development of private enterprise. Nevertheless, Aydemir stressed that the mixed economy did not mean the state had to assist the private sector, on the contrary, both of them had to serve for the welfare of the people. To him, a mixed economy is a statism that functions for the public interest and also it is a private enterprise that does not prioritize its own interests (Aydemir, 1962o, p. 9; Aydemir, 1963c, p. 16). Aydemir's emphasis on public interest is related to his objection to monopolization that emerges with capitalism and its reflection on social structure. As he had done in the period of *Kadro*, he continued to emphasize the concepts of social justice and income equality and advocated that the capitalist economic system prevents the establishment of the social state by dominating the determination of production relations by means of the authority of monopoly. At this point, he presented the socialist front as a balance tool to establish the social state (Aydemir, 1962l, p. 8). To him, socialism connects the social structure with democratic plans, which organizes which goods are to be produced, how they are to be priced, how to make a balance between production and consumption, how to prevent unemployment and how to achieve full employment (Aydemir, 1963c, p. 16).

While indicating the differences between the statism expressed in *Kadro* and *Yön*, the *Yön* circle stated that laborist aspect of statism was not reflected sufficiently in *Kadro*. Therefore, to indicate the difference, they named their understanding of statism as a "new statism", "reformist socialism", and Turkish socialism. Similarly, Aydemir also supported the protection of worker's rights and sympathize their actions. Even though he did not attribute socialist movement to the workers, he saw worker's movement as a component of the socialist movement (Aydemir, 1962k, p. 20). He believed that the nonconflicting society structure was still one of the fundamental qualifications of a nation. He stated that Turkish socialism does not advocate class dictatorship over other classes because such a class domination is the last stage of inter-class conflicts. To him, such conflicts that arise between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are manifested in unplanned democracies, on the basis of unplanned monarchies and autocracies. However, when the economic activities are organized for the benefits of the society by means of a democratic way, both the boundaries between the rival classes and the sharpness of the class struggle are eliminated. Besides, the social state principle in the constitution can prevent the rising of a specific class in the society. To accomplish it, the state has to perform its functions over the economy and also over the private sector has to play its own role in order for the economic well-being of Turkey (Aydemir, 1962j, pp. 10-12; Aydemir, 1962e, p. 9; Aydemir, 1962f, p. 8).

As well as putting emphasis on the economic side of his thesis, Aydemir also introduced Turkish socialism as a progressive continuation of the National liberation movement. More specifically, he saw Turkish socialism as an idea and doctrine movement that maintains the Turkish revolution as a political, economic and social movement (Aydemir, 1963c, p. 16; Aydemir, 1962d, p. 9). Therefore, he frequently stressed that Turkish socialism is not only an economic program but also an overall modernization program that includes every aspect of national life, and it regulates these areas based on the principles taking part in the various declarations of Atatürk (Aydemir, 1962b, p. 7; Aydemir, 1962m, p. 14). In that context, he expressed that one of the core principles of Turkish Socialism was

secularism. He strictly criticized the governments came to power after 1950 for exploiting religion for political issues and diminishing the role of secularism in the formation of social structure (Aydemir, 1963b, p. 10).

Although his thoughts provided a continuity with the *Kadro* period by considering Turkish Socialism as an overall development program, Aydemir's views on the content of this development program changed according to the conditions of the period. As an example of similarity, while he gave a guiding mission to the *avant-garde* cadre in *Kadro* to spread the ideology of the Turkish Revolution to the masses, he continued to emphasize the importance of the intellectuals for the creation and implementation of Turkish socialism in *Yön* (Aydemir, 1962b, p. 7; Aydemir, 1962c, p. 6). On the other hand, he gave up advocating single-party rule. In the 1960s, democracy and the multi-party system were undeniable realities for Aydemir who adapted his thoughts based upon the conditions of the time. Likewise, while in *Kadro*, he was in favor of the government and RPP, in *Yön*, he criticized the political parties of the term for being opportunists and not having a doctrine. He said that the parties, instead of working for the welfare of the country, were fighting with each other, relying on foreign aids, permitting interference of the outside forces in the internal affairs and abusing the religion for their own passions (Aydemir, 1962k, p. 20). Moreover, he signified that there is not a political party in the parliament which will accomplish statism properly, thus, he pointed to the necessity of a new reformist party which will respect to Kemalist principles. According to him, this new party has to transform Turkey into a socialist state within the framework of the constitution (Aydemir, 1962n, p. 20).

Unlike the general understanding, Aydemir was not one of the founders of the *Yön*, but he was among the founders of the *Sosyalist Kültür Derneği* (Socialist Culture Association-in short *SKD*) set up under the presidency of Osman Nuri Torun in December 1962. According to Charter of the Association, which considered the labor as the superior value of the society, *SKD* examines the conditions for establishing a genuine democratic regime under the light of science, which will remove any kind of exploitation and investigates the cultural values of such a system and tries to spread them (Yön, 1962, p. 9). As stated in the memorandum of the *SKD*, in the wake of the Second World War, the implementation of the capitalist economy did not give way to a revenue growth; on the contrary, it deteriorated the division of income in the society. Besides the economic retrogressive, lack of a solution over the social issues made the situation of the society worse. 27 May Movement was realized as a result of the reaction from the society; while it contributed to an awakening among the intellectuals, it also triggered them to take actions against the irregularities (Yön, 1963b, p. 16). Upon a year passed from the military intervention, RPP came to power, *SKD* expressed its dissatisfaction against the government saying that even though the ruling power accepted the development plan, they went ahead with old ties with capitalism. Moreover, members of *SKD* claimed that it is not possible to constitute a social justice while serving to the interests of capitalist order in a developing country, socialism is the sole way for the development in social justice. They emphasized that Turkish socialists undertook the development mission by means of the socialist mixed economy within the democratic order without the domination of a class over another (Yön, 1963b, p. 16).

Within the framework of *SKD*, Aydemir described the fundamentals of Turkish socialism as an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist which means a supporter of the national economy, a proponent of social justice, anti-revisionist against foreign states. He also stated that all the basis of Turkish socialism is coherent with the principles of Mustafa Kemal and noted that in order to accomplish all these principles, an existence of a socialist party is required. However, *SKD* was established to do scientific research in specific affairs such as

translation of foreign publications, studying social issues from the historical perspective, and examining the history of socialism (Aydemir, 1963b, p. 10; Aydemir, 1963c, p. 16). Aydemir was active both in *Yön* and *SKD* until the election of 1965, but the day when the election result was declared, it was a turning point for *SKD* and Aydemir. Upon disappointment in the parliamentary system, *Yön* changed its discourses and transformed into a radical form supporting military intervention to seize the power; as a consequence, *SKD* lost its functions (Atılğan, 2008, pp. 193-194).

The writings of Aydemir in *Yön* mostly belonged to the first years of the journal and concerned to the revival of Kemalist principles which were ignored after 1945. It is clearly seen that since *Kadro* years, the ideas of Aydemir about sticking to Kemalist principles had not changed, but he lost his belief to the RPP about the implementation of these principles. Moreover, he strongly believed the Kemalist principles and their coherence with socialism. Within this regard, his main contribution to the Journal was to offer a new kind of socialism which was unique to Turkey. When the journal changed its discourses from the parliamentary way to revolution, there was no article written by Aydemir to support the new target of the Journal. Even if he wrote in some issues, he just penned the anti-Americanism and responded to the criticisms about his newly published book *İkinci Adam* (The Second Man).

CONCLUSION

Just before the 1965 general elections, the fact that RPP declared its new line as left-of-center and the strict behavior of İnönü against America met with appreciation by the *Yön* (Atılğan, 2008, p. 187; Özdemir, 1986, p. 185). Thus, *Yön* explicitly supported RPP in the election and declared that RPP placed a substantial point in terms of economic independence, social reforms and foreign policy affairs (Yön, 1965b, p. 4). 1965 election held on October resulted in which JP, carried out election campaign based on the anti-communist slogans and Islam, marked an overwhelming victory gained 52% of the total votes and Süleyman Demirel became Prime Minister (Ahmad, 1977, p. 191). The results were a complete disappointment for the *Yön* whereas *TİP*, which succeeded to gain fifteen seats, was glad being the first socialist party representing socialist movement in the Parliament. Moreover, the election showed that the "left-of-center" slogan of RPP was not met what they expected, their votes decreased comparing with the previous elections, got the worst electoral performance in its history (Tachau, 1991, p. 107).

Following the general election in 1965, criticism towards the United States was even more evident, and Demirel was criticized for being a puppet government on the left. Workers were increasingly militant, Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey-*DİSK* was founded. Another meaningful feature of the end of the 60s was the extraordinary radicalism level adopted by Turkish youth. Universities politicized in direction of an independent Turkey from the US and NATO in particular. The repressive policies of the government led to the reaction of the intellectuals, especially the students who were a new political factor in the 60s. Politics had entered to the universities, the factories, and from time to time it had crossed the street. They were undoubtedly influenced by the worldwide tendency, especially in May 1968 by the student uprising in Paris. The anti-imperialism, West and anti-Americanism were marked by these demonstrations (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 197-199).

From *Yön* point of view, it was not possible to struggle with imperialism and its partners and to change social structure through making reforms by means of the election at all. As of this period, *Yön* believed that the salvation of Turkey is possible via "revolution" and searched for ways to become the government through "revolutionary" means (Atılğan, 2008, pp. 193-194). The headlines of the journal published after the election results such as "The Results of the Election Pleased Washington ... The Romantic Period of Socialism Must

Come to an End" were proof of the change within the *Yön* movement (Yön, 1965a, p. 4). The goal of the *Yön* movement was no longer seizing power by gaining the support of the public, but a revolution led by the active forces with the discourses of the "national democratic revolution-MDD", thus, the journal started searching for allies in line with its new target. When *TİP* and RPP were not able to adopt their new strategy in the *Yön* movement, this time they tried to form an alliance with the opposing wing within these political parties. The opposition group in *TİP* led by Mihri Belli defended the *MDD*. Although *Yön* supported Mihri Belli's movement of capturing *TİP* administration, the struggle of the *Yön* ended when the opposition was liquidated from the party (Özdemir, 1986, p. 183). Then, wishing to establish an alliance with the opposition group in the RPP, *Yön* wanted to benefit from the discourse of the "left-of-center" in the party. While Turhan Feyzioğlu, opposing the RPP's new rhetoric, thought that the party should be free from all of the themes that remind us of socialism, Bülent Ecevit, Secretary General of the party, supported the "left-of-center" discourse. *Yön* supported Ecevit and his views. When Feyzioğlu and his team resigned in the RPP's Extraordinary 4th Grand Congress which was held in 1967, *Yön* had reached the target they had determined in the struggle towards the RPP, and now it was time came to organize "revolution" (Atılğan, 2008, pp. 215-216). Over a period of more than six years, *Yön* understood that the parliamentary road was closed for the transition from "non-capitalist path" to socialism in an underdeveloped country like Turkey, so they believed that in order for the country to sail towards socialism, firstly, the social structure that suppresses the working class both economically and ideologically should be changed top-down. This could only be possible through a revolution. Tending towards socialism by organizing the workers was a loss of time for *Yön* leaders (Atılğan, 2008, p. 223). As a result, *Yön* was closed down in 1967 and most of its members started to release another journal named *Devrim* (Revolution) after the general election of 1969 when JP, Süleyman Demirel, became the governmental power again. *Devrim*, published on a weekly basis until the military intervention in 1971, was the outcome of the period when the *Yön* adopted the strategy of seizing power by way of revolution (Atılğan, 2008, p. 288).

As it was tried to reveal in this research, the point of origin of *Yön* movement was the thought that the society had started to move away from Atatürk principles over the last decade, was dependent on foreign aids and thus became prone to foreign interventions. Intellectuals who came together with the thought of creating an independent Turkey by sticking to Kemalist principles and saving the country from its underdeveloped situation by means of a new development programme thanks to the changing political environment after the 1960 *coup d'etat*. Even though they embraced the idea of bringing socialism into Turkey through democratic way, as the time passed and political conditions changed they adopted "revolution" discourse.

Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, who was one of the most important writers of *Yön* journal, tried to systematize the ideas put forward in the journal under the concept of Turkish socialism. In *Yön*, Şevket Süreyya expanded his ideas which were basically the same he supported in *Kadro*. On the other hand, while he referred to the uncompleted nature of Kemalist principles in *Kadro*, the main motivation that Aydemir included *Yön* circle was that the country got further away from the principles of the Turkish Revolution. Additionally, the thoughts of Aydemir were shaped within the political context of the 1960s. Turkish Socialism thesis, produced by Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, is the best example of this alteration. The expanded and adapted to the conditions of the period version of Social Nationalism thesis which was defended in *Kadro* during the 1930s was Turkish socialism concept. These two terms envisioned a system that rejected revolutionary socialism and capitalism, defending the unity of the state, eliminating the dependence on foreign countries through a planned statist

economy, precluding the class differences and providing the development of the country on every field. During the times he contributed to the journal, there were not any writings that defended the Journal's revolution thesis. When the writings of Aydemir in *Yön* were handled, it can be found out that he discussed subjects like keeping the Atatürk principles alive, ensuring economic development through non-capitalist means rather than defending the revolutionary way.

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